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WE GOTTA GET OUT OF THIS PLACE: WHEN RESIDENTIAL 
TENANTS LEAVE DUE TO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
 
 
Elena Marty-Nelson 
  
We gotta get out of this place 
 
if it’s the last thing we ever do. 
We gotta get out of this place 
‘cause girl, there’s a better life 
for me and you.1 
 
 
 
Professor  of Law,  Nova  Southeastern  University  Shepard  Broad  Law Center,  J.D. 
Georgetown   University  Law  Center,  1983;  LL.M.,  Georgetown   University  Law  Center, 
1986.   I sincerely  appreciate  the opportunity  I had to participate  in the William  H. Bowen 
School  of  Law  University  of  Arkansas  at Little  Rock  Ben  J. Altheimer  Symposium  on  A 
Question  of Balance:    40 Years  of the  Uniform  Residential  Landlord  and  Tenant  Act  and 
Tenants’  Rights in Arkansas.   I gained invaluable  insights  both during the presentations  and 
in the conversations  throughout  the conference  from  the faculty  organizer,  Professor  Lynn 
Foster,  the  keynote  speaker,  Professor  Dale  Whitman,  and  my  fellow  panelists  Professor 
Alice  Noble-Allgire,   Douglas  Smith,  Esq.,  Professor  Donald  Campbell,   Professor   Eloisa 
Rodriguez-Dod,  Professor  Missy Lonegrass,  and Professor  Lawrence  McDonough,  Esq.   My 
thanks  as  well  to the  members  of  the  University  of  Arkansas  at  Little  Rock  Law  Review 
especially  Kitty  L.  Cone, the Symposium Editor, and Abtin Mehdizadegan,  the Editor-in- Chief. 
I am also deeply grateful for the exceptional research assistance of Michelle Nichols DeLong 
and Kelli Feneran Lago. 
1.   THE ANIMALS, WE GOTTA GET OUT OF THIS PLACE (MGM Records  1965).  Using a 
song in the title of a law review article or in a court opinion is not an uncommon tactic simply 
to pique interest  and to set a tone for the discourse.  See Alex B. Long, [Insert  Song Lyrics 
Here]:  The Uses and Misuses of Popular  Music Lyrics in Legal Writing, 64 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 531,  533–34  (2007).  While  I never  shy away  from  popular  culture  references  in my 
teaching  and scholarship,  in this instance  I inserted  the title and portions  of the lyrics for a 
more significant  reason.  The song lyrics  quoted  here vividly  express  a raw need to leave  a 
place hurriedly. This article advocates for early lease terminations without ongoing economic 
liability for victims of domestic violence. Empowering victims of domestic  violence to move 
away from their abusers  may save their lives.  See discussion  infra  Part III. In addition, the 
song, We Gotta  Get Out of This Place,  has a particular  meaning  for servicemembers.  It was 
incredibly  popular with soldiers serving in Vietnam and it was also popular with a new gen- 
eration  of  servicemembers   serving  in  Iraq.  See 500 Greatest Songs  of All Time, ROLLING 
STONE   MUSIC,   http://www.rollingstone.com/music/lists/the-500-greatest-songs-of-all-time- 
20110407/the-animals-we-gotta-get-out-of-this-place-20110527 (last visited  May 21, 2013). 
The connection  of active duty servicemembers  to the song serves as a reminder  of the sacri- 
fices made by active duty servicemembers  today. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
There are many compelling circumstances where tenants must leave 
their residential dwellings quickly. For my presentation at the Ben J. Al-
theimer Symposium on the fortieth anniversary of the Uniform Residential 
Landlord and Tenant Act (“URLTA”),2 I concentrated on two categories of 
residential tenants who may need to terminate their leases early because of
exigent circumstances. First, I focused on domestic violence victims who 
need to flee their abusers. Second, I examined the need for active duty ser-
vicemembers to terminate their leases early when called to deploy or given 
orders for a permanent change of duty station. While in many respects these 
two categories of tenants present very different challenges, ensuring early 
lease terminations for both—without continuing obligations or penalties—
serves critical societal goals that transcend the immediate parties involved.
Clearly, domestic violence is a complex and debilitating problem.3
Similarly, supporting our active duty servicemembers in their efforts to ful-
fill their missions requires multifaceted and sustained efforts.4 Helping vic-
tims of domestic violence and supporting our servicemembers involves ad-
dressing issues far beyond landlord-tenant laws. Both goals require effective 
mobilization of social, political, and legal forces as well as significant public 
and private economic commitments. The complexity of alleviating the 
broader issues should not, however, deter focused efforts at mitigating the 
immediate landlord-tenant problems that arise for victims of domestic vio-
lence and for servicemembers and who must terminate their residential leas-
es early. Accordingly, this article explores how the discrete area of the law 
on early residential lease termination affects both categories of tenants and 
suggests possible changes to alleviate ongoing concerns. This targeted re-
search into early lease termination for victims of domestic violence and for 
servicemembers may spur two other important lines of research. First, it 
may encourage similar research into early lease termination for other cate-
2. Uniform Law Commission, Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, THE NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Committee.aspx?title=Residential%20Landlord%20and%20Tenant%20Act (last visited May
21, 2013) [hereinafter Residential Landlord and Tenant Act].
3. See Memorandum from Alice Noble-Allgire, Reporter, Joint Editorial Board for 
Uniform Real Property Acts, on Early Lease Termination for Domestic Violence and Other 
Reasons to the URLTA Drafting Committee, Uniform Law Commission (Feb. 12, 2012), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/urlta_me
mo_earlyleasetermination_021212.pdf; Anne C. Johnson, Note, From House to Home: Cre-
ating a Right to Early Lease Termination for Domestic Violence Victims, 90 MINN. L. REV.
1859, 1865 (2006).
4. See JOHN S. ODOM, JR., A JUDGE’S BENCHBOOK FOR THE SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL 
RELIEF ACT 4 (2011).
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gories of tenants facing exigent circumstances.5 Second, shining a light on 
the effects of landlord-tenant laws on domestic violence victims and ser-
vicemembers may spur research into different areas of the law affecting 
them and may lead to necessary changes in those areas.6
In terms of the structure of the article, it continues a conversation 
among the symposium participants as to when landlord-tenant laws 
should—for public policy reasons—allow tenants who are victims of do-
mestic violence or active duty servicemembers to terminate their residential 
leases early without continuing obligations. Part II briefly describes tradi-
tional landlord-tenant laws dealing with tenant abandonment of a lease. This 
part also discusses a more recent movement away from the concept of tenant 
abandonment and in favor of some excused early terminations. Part III turns 
specifically to the issue of domestic violence victims and early lease termi-
nation. It also analyzes options and suggests guidelines for uniform provi-
sions for tenant-victims. Part IV examines the laws of early lease termina-
tion applicable to servicemembers. Unlike the situation with victims of do-
mestic violence where the law is only recently developing, there already 
exists a robust framework of laws governing early lease terminations by 
servicemembers.7 The most important framework is found in the protections 
granted to servicemembers in the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act 
(“SCRA”).8 This part of the article discusses the SCRA generally and then 
5. See generally Memorandum from Sheldon F. Kurtz, Study Comm. Chair, Joint 
Editorial Board on Uniform Real Property Acts, to the Scope and Program Committee, Uni-
form Law Commission (May 18, 2011), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential
%20landlord%20and%20tenant/urlta_studycmtereport_051811.pdf [hereinafter Memoran-
dum from Kurtz],.  For example, research may be needed for tenants faced with relocation
due to a need to move to assisted living facilities or to maintain or obtain employment. See id.
at 16.
6. For example, victims of domestic violence could perhaps benefit from additional 
research on the laws governing privacy. Servicemembers may benefit from additional re-
search into the laws governing health care and child custody.
7. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501–597(b) (2006).  
Appendices to United States Code titles generally contain court rules, or laws related to the 
subject matter of a positive law title, but not enacted as part of the title, or that were consid-
ered temporary. The statutes in both the Code title and the appendix have been enacted into 
law and are equally valid.
There are five appendices in the Code. The appendices to titles 11, 18, and 28 
mostly contain Federal court rules. The appendix to title 5 contains freestanding 
laws that relate to the subject matter of title 5 but were not incorporated into that 
title by Congress. The appendix to title 50 contains freestanding laws that relate 
to the subject matter of title 50 but were probably thought to be inappropriate to 
that title because of their specificity or duration. Sections in the appendices to ti-
tles 5 and 18 retain their act section numbers while those in the appendix to title 
50 have been assigned different Code section numbers. Translations are not 
874 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
focuses on the provision of the SCRA that allows a servicemember to termi-
nate his residential lease early. This part also addresses corresponding state 
statutes that provide additional protections for servicemembers and de-
scribes some of the continuing gaps in the protections offered servicemem-
bers and their families both under the SCRA and the existing state statutes. 
Part V concludes the article with a recommendation for uniform laws on 
early lease termination for both tenant-victims and servicemembers.
II. MODERN CHANGES TO LEASE THEORY
A. Traditional Abandonment and Mitigation
When a landlord wants to terminate a landlord-tenant relationship prior 
to the termination date of the lease, the concept is referred to as an eviction.9
When the tenant is the party who wants to terminate the relationship early, 
the tenant’s vacating is generally referred to as an abandonment of the 
lease.10
Traditionally a landlord had three options when a tenant abandoned 
leased premises before the termination date, regardless of the tenant’s rea-
sons for vacating. First, the landlord could absolve the tenant of any con-
tinuing obligation for the remaining term of the lease.11 Second, the landlord 
could continue to hold the tenant responsible for the remaining term of the 
lease, but the landlord’s damages would be reduced by the landlord’s duty to 
made in the appendices. The fact that an act is included in an appendix does not 
affect its meaning or validity.
Detailed Guide to the United States Code Content and Features, USCODEBETA.HOUSE.GOV,
http://uscodebeta.house.gov/detailed_guide.xhtml#appendices (last visited October 25, 2013).
9. See generally Professor Rodriguez-Dod’s article in this symposium issue for a 
thoughtful and perceptive discussion of modern changes to eviction laws.  Eloisa C. Rodri-
guez-Dod, “But My Lease Isn’t Up Yet!”: Finding Fault with “No-Fault” Evictions, 35 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 839 (2013).
10. See John V. Orth, Leases: Like Any Other Contract?, 12 GREEN BAG 53, 53–54
(Autumn 2008).
11. This release of the tenant from the tenant’s continuing obligation under the lease 
contract is commonly referred to as an acceptance of the surrender. See Stephanie G. Flynn, 
Duty to Mitigate Damages Upon a Tenant's Abandonment, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
721, 746 (2000). It is more likely to occur when a landlord would not suffer significant eco-
nomic consequences from the tenant’s abandoning of the premises. For example, when the 
landlord has a waiting list for the dwelling unit or when the market rent chargeable to a pro-
spective new tenant would be higher than the rent on the existing lease with the vacating 
tenant. In these scenarios, the current law of abandonment does not pose any special prob-
lems for the tenant with exigent circumstances. Concerns arise, however, when a landlord 
chooses not to release the tenant but rather to hold the tenant responsible under the tenant’s 
lease contract for the remaining term of the lease.
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mitigate.12 Finally, under the third option, the landlord could do nothing, 
leave the premises vacant, and hold the tenant liable for the remaining term 
of the lease as it became due.13
The URLTA eliminated the third option of doing nothing.14 In part as a 
testament to the strength of the URLTA many states no longer allow the 
option of doing nothing.15 In those states, if the landlord decides to hold the 
tenant responsible for the remaining term of the lease, the landlord’s damag-
es would be reduced to the extent the landlord could have mitigated the 
damages.16
Even in jurisdictions that eliminate the landlord’s option of doing noth-
ing, however, a tenant may have continuing economic obligations under the 
lease when the landlord cannot fully mitigate.  This ongoing economic re-
sponsibility may be the logical consequence of entering into a contract.  
And, it may even be a fair and reasonable solution when the tenant’s reasons 
for vacating and not fulfilling the terms of the lease contract are simply be-
cause the tenant chooses to relocate for a better opportunity.
Does the abandonment and mitigation system work, however, when the 
tenant must relocate due to exigent circumstances?  Or, are there instances 
where the involuntary and almost compulsory relocation needs of the tenant 
make the abandonment and mitigation system inapt?  This article posits that 
while the mitigation system may work in typical cases of voluntary moves 
by tenants, it is not the appropriate model in cases where the tenant must 
move due to exigent circumstances and the situation involves vital public 
policy considerations such as protecting victims of domestic violence or 
ensuring immediate deployment of active duty servicemembers.  In those 
limited cases involving quasi-compulsory relocation, the public policy needs 
trump the need to hold tenants liable for the remaining terms of their lease 
contracts.17
12. Technically, a landlord does not owe a duty to anyone. The duty to mitigate termi-
nology is simply shorthand to explain that the landlord’s damages would be reduced by dam-
ages the landlord could have avoided by mitigating. See id. at 723.
13. See id. at 725–27.
14. See Kurtz, supra note 5, at 8 (indicating that the "URLTA require[d] 'an aggrieved 
party' to mitigate damages").
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Another reason the abandonment model for early lease termination is inappropriate 
in these instances of quasi-compulsory relocation is because true abandonment implies a 
voluntary intent to abandon on the part of the tenant. The compulsory nature of the relocation 
in these quasi-compulsory cases suggests that the tenant has no such voluntary intent to 
abandon.
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B. Moving Toward Early Lease Termination Clauses
Some states have moved away from the common law concepts of 
abandonment and mitigation for tenants with certain exigent circumstanc-
es.18 Delaware, in particular, has embraced the concept of excused early 
lease termination, allowing for termination without continuing obligation by 
tenants in several circumstances.19 For example, in Delaware a tenant may 
terminate his lease upon thirty days written notice if “the tenant’s present 
employer requires a change in the location of the tenant’s residence in ex-
cess of [thirty] miles.”20 Additionally, a tenant in Delaware can terminate a
lease if the tenant, or an immediate family member, suffers from serious 
illness or death that requires a permanent change in the tenant’s location.21
Other reasons a tenant may terminate without continuing obligation under 
the tenant’s contract in Delaware include the tenant’s acceptance into a sen-
ior citizens’ housing facility,22 the tenant’s admission into governmental 
housing,23 the tenant entering into military service,24 or the tenant becoming 
a victim of domestic violence.25 Finally, Delaware also allows a personal 
representative or a surviving spouse to terminate a lease upon the tenant’s 
death.26
Other states have also accepted certain, albeit more limited, circum-
stances for permitting excused early-lease terminations.27 In Michigan, for 
example, a tenant who has occupied a rental unit for more than thirteen
months may terminate a lease early if the tenant becomes eligible to take 
possession of a subsidized rental unit in senior citizen housing28 or if the 
tenant becomes incapable of living independently during the lease term.29
Michigan also provides a tenant-victim of domestic violence, stalking, or
sexual assault the option to terminate a lease early.30 Moreover, as aware-
ness of domestic abuse has become more prevalent, a significant number of 
18. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5314 (2013).
19. Id. §§ 5314, 7010a.
20. Id. § 5314(b)(1).
21. Id. § 5314(b)(2).
22. Id. § 5314(b)(3).
23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5314(b)(4).
24. Id. § 5314(b)(5).
25. Id. § 5314(b)(6).
26. Id. § 5314(b)(7).
27. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 83.682(1) (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-22(b) (2010); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3261(A) (2009).
28. MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 554.601a(1)(a) (Supp. 2013).
29. Id. § 554.601a(1)(b). The statute expressly provides that it "applies only to leases 
entered into, renewed, or renegotiated after the effective date of this section, in accordance 
with the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts provided by section 10 of 
article I of the [Michigan Constitution]."  Id. § 554.601a(2).
30. Id. § 554.601b(1).
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states have adopted laws protecting tenants who are victims of domestic 
abuse.31
In addition, many states have enacted statutes that protect the interests 
of tenants who are servicemembers.32 Even though active duty servicemem-
ber tenants are generally protected from ongoing lease obligations by the 
SCRA,33 many states have expanded on the federal law by adding additional 
provisions.34 The state statutes generally enhance the federal protection for 
servicemembers by eliminating certain procedural hurdles or broadening the 
categories of servicemembers entitled to protection.35
While the SCRA and the corresponding state statutes provide certain 
benefits for servicemembers, they do not cover several critical areas in prac-
tical and necessary ways. Similarly, while the state statutes protecting vic-
tims of domestic violence are indispensable enhancements to the common 
law, they, too, need to be expanded in order to provide practical protection.
Many states still do not have statutes providing relief for tenant-victims of 
domestic violence. Moreover, as noted above, the states that currently do 
have statutes vary greatly in their protections. A set of uniform standards 
could serve as a best practice guide for states considering adopting protec-
tions and for states thinking of revising their statutes.36 Uniform standards 
would help provide consistency.37
31. Several states have specialized laws allowing for early lease termination for victims 
of domestic violence. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1318 (Supp. 2012); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1946.7 (West 2010 & Supp. 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402 (2013); CONN.
GEN. STAT § 47a-11e (Supp. 2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5314 (2009); D.C. CODE § 42-
3505.07 (2001); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 750/15 (2009); IND. CODE § 32-31-9-12 (Supp. 2012);
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-5A-02 (LexisNexis 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, § 24 
(Supp. 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.601b (Supp. 2013); MINN. STAT. § 504B.206 (Supp. 
2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-9.6 (West Supp. 2013); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 227-c
(McKinney Supp. 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-17.1 
(Supp. 2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.453 (2010 & Supp. 2013); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §
92.016 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-22-5.1 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp.
2013); WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.575 (Supp. 2013); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1303
(2013).
32. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 83.682(1); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-22(b); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3261A.
33. 50 U.S.C. app. § 535 (2006).
34. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 83.682; GA. CODE ANN.§ 44-7-22; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:3261.
35. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 83.682; GA. CODE ANN.§ 44-7-22; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:3261.
36. See generally Lawrence R. McDonough, Then and Now: The Uniform Residential 
Landlord and Tenant Act and the Revised Residential Landlord and Tenant Act—Still Bold 
and Relevant?, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 975 (2013).
37. Id.
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III. EARLY LEASE TERMINATION FOR TENANT-VICTIMS
Ensuring that tenant-victims of domestic violence can successfully flee 
their abusers serves a critical societal goal.38 “Experts in the area of domes-
tic violence suggest that one of the most important factors in escaping do-
mestic violence is for the victim to get away (physical separation) from the 
offender and the violent situation.”39 It has become increasingly clear that 
staying in a home where domestic violence is either imminent or has already 
occurred will likely subject the victim to further abuse.40 To distance the 
victim from the abuse requires either that the victim leave, or that the ag-
gressor be removed. However, the threat of continuing liability under a resi-
dential lease agreement or the risk of the landlord withholding the security 
deposit may prevent tenant-victims from leaving.41 The “growing apprecia-
tion of the nature of the serious economic and personal safety problems 
faced by tenant-victims of domestic violence” has led twenty-one states to 
enact statutes regarding early termination of leases due to domestic vio-
lence.42 These statutes are, however, far from uniform.43 In the past couple 
38. Victims of domestic violence suffer many physical and emotional consequences. 
Intimate Partner Violence: Consequences, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/violencePrevention/intimatepartnerviolence/consequences.html (last 
updated Sep. 26, 2012). Some effects of the injuries, although not limited, include broken 
bones, bruises, head injuries, and depression. Id.
39. Memorandum from R. Wilson Freyermuth, Exec. Dir., Joint Editorial Bd. for Unif.
Real Prop. Acts, to Uniform Law Commission Scope and Program Committee, on Recom-
mendation for Study Committee on Potential Revisions to Uniform Residential Landlord-
Tenant Act (URLTA) 2 (June 1, 2010), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/
docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/urlta_jeburpa_proposal_060110.pdf [herein-
after Memorandum from Freyermuth].
40. See Lee Eshelman &Alytia A. Levendosky, Dating Violence: Mental Health Conse-
quences Based on Type of Abuse, 27 VICTIMS & VIOLENCE 215, 216 (2012) (“[D]ating vio-
lence, like [intimate partner violence] in a marital/living together relationship, is typically a 
repeated trauma.”).
41. The ability [of the victim to gain distance from his or her abuser], however, 
has proven to be a problem for victims who are parties to a lease agreement. 
These victims may face steep early termination penalties or continued lia-
bility for unaccrued rent, simply for wanting to escape a dangerous situa-
tion. This is especially harmful for those victims who have little or no fi-
nancial support. As a result, domestic violence victims may feel economi-
cally compelled to choose to stay with their abuser or in their current living 
situation, rather than face the economic hardship of leaving.
Memorandum from R. Wilson Freyermuth, supra note 39, at 2.
42. Id. at 3; see statutes referenced supra note 29.
43. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1946.7 (West 2013) (a vacating tenant-victim must give 
30 days’ notice to the landlord, within 180 days of the date of an order or report of domestic 
violence), with D.C. CODE § 42-3505.07 (2009) (a vacating tenant-victim must give 14 days’ 
notice to the landlord, within 90 days of the date of an order or report of domestic violence).  
Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5314(b)(6) (2009) (“tenancy may be terminated . . . [b]y
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of years significant consideration has been devoted to the need for uniform 
laws on early lease termination by tenant-victims of domestic violence.44
In 2010 the Joint Editorial Board on Uniform Real Property Acts rec-
ommended that the Scope and Program committee form a study committee 
to consider revising URLTA.45 In determining whether it was time to con-
sider revising the URLTA, the Joint Editorial Board noted two issues that 
were not addressed in the original URLTA: tenant security deposits and 
whether victims of domestic violence should be able to terminate their leas-
es.46 Shortly thereafter, the Study and Program Committee recommended 
that a study committee be formed to consider these issues and to consider 
more broadly whether it was time to revise URLTA. The Study Committee, 
comprised of some of the leading experts and voices in property law, ana-
lyzed these issues and unanimously agreed that a drafting committee be 
formed not just to consider the initial two issues that had been flagged as 
missing from the original URLTA, but also to address URLTA more com-
prehensively.47
Focusing on the specific issue of domestic violence, the Study Com-
mittee examined the laws in several states that allow domestic violence vic-
tims to terminate their leases early and noted that they varied considerably 
in terms of their scope, requirements, and effects.48 Accordingly, with near 
unanimous support of the stakeholders, the study committee recommended 
that the drafting committee “consider whether to revise URLTA to allow 
victims of domestic abuse to terminate leases.”49
Subsequently, the drafters of the proposed revised URLTA 
(“RURLTA”) submitted drafts of the RURLTA that include early termina-
tion provisions for victims of domestic violence.50 In analyzing the proposed 
a tenant who is the victim of domestic abuse,” thus requiring “actual victim” status), with
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.601b (Supp. 2013) (tenancy may be terminated by a “tenant who 
has a reasonable apprehension of present danger to the tenant . . . from domestic violence,” 
allowing for termination before violence has occurred), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-9.6 (West 
Supp. 2013) (tenancy may be terminated by submitting notice to the landlord that the “tenant 
. . . faces an imminent threat of serious physical harm,” also allowing for termination before 
violence has occurred, but not requiring the tenant’s fear be reasonable).
44. Memorandum from Kurtz, supra note 5, at 9–15.
45. Memorandum from Freyermuth, supra note 39, at 2.
46. Memorandum from Kurtz, supra note 5, at 1.
47. The study committee members were Sheldon Kurtz, Chair, William Barrett, Jack 
Davies, Lynn Foster, William Hillman, Edward Lowry, Reed Martineau, Robert McCurley, 
Janice Pauls, Patrick Randolph, and Ken Takayama. Barry Hawkins is the Division Chair and 
Larry Ruth is the Scope and Program Liaison. Id. at 1.  There were also four observers:  John 
Sebert, Kieran Marion, Katie Robinson, and R. Wilson Freyermuth.  Id.
48. Id. at 13–16.
49. Id. at 15.
50. As of the date of submission of this article there were three drafts of the RURLTA.  
REVISED UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT §§ 508–510 (Sept. 17, 2012 
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RURLTA’s provisions on early termination for tenant-victims, it helps to 
examine the various protections found in the existing state statutes dealing 
directly with early lease termination by tenant-victims. In addition, guidance 
for certain provisions is also available from various comparable federal 
laws, especially the recently reauthorized Violence Against Women Act
(“VAWA”).51
Draft), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Residential%20Landlord%20
and%20Tenant/2012sep17_URLTA_MtgDraft.pdf [hereinafter RURLTA DRAFT 1]; REVISED 
UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT §§ 508–510 (Jan. 28, 2013 Draft), avail-
able at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/
2013jan28_RURLTA_MtgDraft.pdf [hereinafter RURLTA DRAFT 2]; REVISED UNIFORM 
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT §§ 508–510 (April 2, 2013 Draft), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Residential%20Landlord%20and%20Tenant/2013a
pr2_RURLTA_MtgDraft.pdf [hereinafter RURLTA DRAFT 3].
51. The Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 signed into law by Pres-
ident Obama on March 7, 2013, reauthorizes, with some changes, the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA) that was originally passed by Congress as Title IV of the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322). The full text of the reau-
thorized VAWA can be found at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113s47enr/pdf/
BILLS-113s47enr.pdf (last visited October 25, 2013). The VAWA, as reauthorized in 2013, 
expressly requires that any department carrying out a covered housing program adopt a mod-
el emergency plan providing for tenants who are victims of domestic violence, dating vio-
lence, sexual assault, or stalking to relocate to another available and safe dwelling unit of 
assisted housing.  Id.
Even beyond the VAWA, the federal government has recognized the importance of 
compensating victims of domestic violence for decades. Njeri Mathis Ruthledge, Looking a 
Gift Horse in the Mouth--The Underutilization of Crime Victim Compensation Funds by 
Domestic Violence Victims, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 223 (2011). Under the 
Crime Victim Compensation statute, commonly known as VOCA, victims of various crimes 
can be compensated for their losses as a result of the crimes committed onto them. 42 U.S.C.
§ 10602 (2006). Pursuant to VOCA, the Federal Fund distributes money each year to various
state compensation programs. Id. § 10602(a). States are also at liberty to create their own 
Crime Victim Compensation (CVC) programs, but must meet various criteria that the federal 
statute sets out. Id. § 10602(b). For example, a state compensation program must offer vic-
tims (including domestic violence victims) compensation for various expenses such as medi-
cal, lost wages, and funeral expenses resulting from the compensable crime. Id. Moreover, 
the state program must promote law enforcement cooperation and victims of federal crimes 
within the state must be compensated equally to victims of state crimes. Id. In addition, no 
program can deny compensation against a victim because of her familial relationship with her 
offender. Id. § 10602(b)(7). Currently, all fifty states have CVC programs established. Ruth-
ledge, supra note 51, at 230. Almost half of the states have structured their programs to in-
clude distribution of relocation expenses, especially for victims of domestic violence. Id. at 
232. Perhaps the most generous of these relocation programs is Alaska’s, which distributes 
up to $5,000 one-time only to a victim with a credible threat to her safety and in exceptional
circumstances, maybe more. State of Alaska Violent Crimes Comp. Bd., Relocation,
DOA.ALASKA.GOV, http://doa.alaska.gov/vccb/pdf/RelocationPlan.pdf (last visited October 
28, 2013). However, distribution of funds is limited to certain criteria being met. See id.
Similarly, Texas allows for a one-time award of $3,800—$2,000 for relocation expenses and 
$1,800 for rental expenses. Attorney Gen. of Tex., Rent and Relocation, STATE.TX.US,
https://www.oag.state.tx.us/victims/relocation.shtml (last visited October 28, 2013).
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The main issues to consider when evaluating proposed uniform rules 
on early lease termination for tenant-victims of domestic violence are the 
provisions on who qualifies for relief and what relief should be provided. 
That in turn requires analysis of when a tenant is deemed to be a tenant-
victim.
A. Definition of Tenant-Victims for Purposes of Early Lease Termination
Even defining a tenant-victim for purposes of early lease termination 
requires significant analysis and consideration. Should tenant-victims who 
obtain relief from their leases be limited to those who are abused by their 
spouses, former spouses, relatives, or by those with whom they cohabitate? 
Or should the early lease termination provisions recognize that abuse neces-
sitating an immediate change in location by a tenant-victim could be perpe-
trated by a former boyfriend, girlfriend, stepparent, non-relative, acquaint-
ance, or even a stranger? Is the term “domestic violence,” even if broadly 
defined,52 the correct term to use in light of modern recognition of the risks 
from stalking and dating violence?
Interestingly, Florida has a statute completely dedicated to relocation expenses for victims of 
domestic violence. FLA. STAT. § 960.198 (2013). Florida offers up to $1,500 per incident, but 
caps relocation assistance to $3,000 per lifetime. Id. § 960.198(1). Even though some states 
offer relocation assistance to victims of domestic violence, all of them have stringent re-
quirements attached to those awards that may prevent a tenant-victim from ever seeking the 
funds he or she may desperately need. See Ruthledge supra note 51, at 239. Although CVC 
programs are managed by individual states, their eligibility requirements are very similar.  
]Id. “Programs generally require that the victim: 1) report the crime promptly to law en-
forcement, 2) cooperate with police and prosecutors in the investigation and prosecution of 
the case, 3) submit a timely application to the compensation program, 4) have a loss not 
covered by insurance or some other collateral source, and 5) be innocent of criminal activity 
or significant misconduct that caused or contributed to the victim’s injury or death.” Id.
Additionally, many of the relocation assistance funds are underutilized by victims of domes-
tic violence simply due to a lack of awareness. Id. at 240. If these victim compensation funds 
were truly funded and easily available, an argument could be made that early termination of 
leases for tenant-victims would not be as critical. Until such time as those alternatives are 
truly available, early termination statutes are necessary to ensure that the public policy goal 
of ensuring tenant-victims can relocate when faced with imminent harm.
52. North Dakota lists several types of abuse as domestic violence, and defines what 
constitutes a qualifying relationship. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (Supp. 2013). In North 
Dakota, domestic violence “includes physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity compelled 
by physical force, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, 
sexual activity compelled by physical force, or assault, not committed in self-defense, on the 
complaining family or household members.” Id. It goes on to define a “family or household 
member” as any number of cohabitants or persons who are in a dating relationship. Id. Inter-
estingly, a few states, including Texas, use the term “family violence” rather than “domestic 
violence.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004 (West 2001); see also CONN. GEN. STAT § 46b-38a 
(Supp. 2013) (defining the term “family violence” and not “domestic violence”); D.C. CODE
§ 16-1001 (2001) (using “intimate partner violence” and “intrafamily violence,” but not “do-
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Instead of attempting a broad definition of “domestic violence,” Draft 
Three of the proposed RURLTA explicitly provides that its early lease ter-
mination provisions apply to victims of “domestic violence,” “sexual as-
sault,” or “stalking.”53 Although laudable for expressly including sexual 
assault and stalking, Draft Three of RURLTA could perhaps be expanded
even further to include “dating violence” in light of modern recognition of 
its devastating effects.54 For guidance, it is instructive to note that the federal 
VAWA defines “dating violence” as violence committed by a person who is 
or has been in a social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the 
victim.55
A related question is whether the RURLTA should attempt to define 
the various types of violence for purposes of early lease termination or if it 
should instead suggest that the adopting states refer back to their own vari-
ous state definitions of domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, and da-
ting violence. Several of the existing statutes in this area provide a definition 
of “domestic” or other types of violence by reference to state statutes in dif-
ferent areas of the law, such as family law or criminal law.56
Draft One of the proposed RURLTA defines “domestic violence” as 
“the infliction of physical injury, sexual assault, or the stalking of a tenant or 
an immediate family member by a perpetrator regardless of whether the 
perpetrator is related to the tenant or an immediate family member.”57 By 
contrast, Draft Two of the proposed RURLTA does not provide a definitive 
and singular definition of domestic violence; instead it provides three alter-
mestic violence”). Despite the different terminology in Texas, the definition is largely similar 
to other states’ definitions of domestic violence, in that it is “an act [or threat that reasonably 
places one in fear] by a member of a family or household against another member of the 
family or household that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sex-
ual assault,” as well as abuse or dating violence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004. According 
to the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence (“NCADV”), domestic violence is “the 
willful intimidation, physical assault, battery, sexual assault, and/or other abusive behavior 
perpetrated by an intimate partner against another.” Domestic Violence Facts, NATIONAL 
COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFact
Sheet(National).pdf (last visited May 21, 2013) [hereinafter NCADV Facts].
53. RURLTA DRAFT 3, supra note 50 § 508(a) provides in part that if a “tenant or an 
immediate family member becomes the victim of an act of domestic violence, sexual assault, 
or stalking, which creates a reasonable fear in the tenant or the immediate family member that 
the tenant or the immediate family member will suffer serious bodily harm or death by con-
tinued residence in the dwelling unit, the tenant is released from the lease . . . .”
54. See Comments submitted April 4, 2013, by the ABA Commission on Domestic and 
Sexual Violence on Draft 3 of RURLTA, available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/
docs/Residential%20Landlord%20and%20Tenant/2013apr4_RURLTA_ABA%20CDSV%20
letter.pdf (last visited October 28, 2013).
55. 42 U.S.C. §13925(a)(10) (2006).
56. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1318(A) (Supp. 2012) (directing the reader to 
another statutory provision for a definition).
57. RURLTA DRAFT 1, supra note 50 § 102(8).
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native definitions.58 Moreover, one of the three alternatives suggests that the 
adopting state insert its own existing definition of domestic violence.59 The
definition provisions of Draft Three of the proposed RURLTA provides that 
“domestic violence,” “sexual assault,” and “stalking” are to be defined by 
reference to their various definitions in other state law.60
B. What Threat or Event Triggers the Early Termination Provisions?
Many of the statutes currently enacted require that the tenant seeking to 
vacate “is a victim” or “was a victim.”61 For example, Oregon requires a 
domestic violence victim to have a status of “actual victim.”62 The statute 
grants no relief unless violence has already occurred.63 In addition, the stat-
utes generally require the victim to give notice of intent to vacate within a
certain period of time from the incident.64 In Oregon, for example, the most 
recent act of violence must have occurred not later than ninety days prior to 
the notice of intent to terminate the lease in order for the victim to retain 
“actual victim” status.65
By contrast, a group of states provide that a tenant who has not yet 
been a victim may nevertheless obtain relief from her lease if the tenant is in 
fear of an “imminent threat” of domestic abuse.66 For example, New Jer-
sey’s statute provides relief for tenants before actual physical abuse occurs.67
The statute covers a tenant “fac[ing] an imminent threat of serious physical 
harm from another named person” if the tenant does not vacate.68 Massachu-
setts—the most recent state to enact such a statute—also falls under this 
category.69 In Massachusetts, a tenant may provide written notification to the 
landlord to terminate the lease if the tenant or “a member of a tenant’s 
58. RURLTA DRAFT 2, supra note 50 § 102(11).
59. Id.
60. RURLTA DRAFT 3, supra note 50 § 102(13), (37), (39).
61. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5314 (2009); IND. CODE § 32-31-9-12(c)(2) 
(2002 & Supp. 2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.575(1)(a) (2004 & Supp. 2013).
62. OR. REV. STAT. § 90.453 (2010 & Supp. 2013).
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., id.
65. See id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1946.7(c) (West 2010 & Supp. 2013) (notice shall 
be given within 180 days from an order or report); D.C. CODE § 42-3505.07(e) (2001) (notice 
must be given within 90 days of violence).
66. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-17.1 (1999 & Supp. 2013) (a tenant who “fears 
imminent domestic violence”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1303(a)(1) (2013) (the tenant “was 
under a credible threat of imminent domestic abuse or sexual violence”).
67. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-9.6(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2013).
68. Id. The New Jersey statute indicates that the lease termination is to take effect on the 
thirtieth day following receipt of notice, unless the parties agree to an earlier termination. Id.
§ 46:8–9.7(a).
69. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, § 24(a) (2003 & Supp. 2013).
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household is reasonably in fear of imminent serious physical harm from 
domestic violence.”70
Interestingly, some state statutes require both—that the victim has ex-
perienced domestic violence and fears that such violence has not yet termi-
nated.71 Minnesota, for example, requires that the tenant be “a victim of do-
mestic abuse and fears imminent domestic abuse.”72 Similarly, in Connecti-
cut the statute provides relief from the lease for “any tenant who (1) is a 
victim of family violence . . . and (2) reasonably believes it is necessary to 
vacate the dwelling unit due to fear of imminent harm” to terminate the 
rental agreement without penalty.73
Draft Three of the proposed RURLTA appears to follow the group of 
states that requires both.74 It provides that the early lease termination provi-
sion applies if the
tenant or an immediate family member becomes a victim of an act of 
domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking, which creates a reason-
able fear in the tenant or the immediate family member that the tenant 
or the immediate family member will suffer serious bodily harm or death 
by continued residence in the dwelling unit . . . .75
Should instead, the RURLTA adopt the lead of the newer state statutes 
that allow early termination based on an “imminent threat” as long as there 
is appropriate verification of reasonable fear? The Draft Three requirement 
that the tenant or tenant's family member must have already have been a 
victim is  particularly unwarranted since Draft Three very carefully and cor-
rectly provides an express section clarifying that the landlord has significant 
ongoing rights against the perpetrator of the violence.76
Draft Three provides that a landlord “may recover from the perpetrator 
actual damages resulting from the tenant's exercise” of the tenant’s early 
release rights.77 The provision also provides that “if the perpetrator is a party 
to the lease” the landlord may “hold the perpetrator liable on the lease for 
further rent payable under the lease.”78
Several states also specifically address the liability of the victim’s per-
petrator within their statutes.79 For example, North Carolina is very explicit 
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 504B.206 (2002 & Supp. 2013).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-11e(a) (2007 & Supp. 2013) (emphasis added).
74. RURLTA DRAFT 3, supra note 50 § 508(a).
75. Id.
76. RURLTA DRAFT 3, supra note 50 § 508.
77. Id. § 510(a).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1318I. (2007 & Supp. 2012); MD. CODE ANN.,
REAL PROP. § 8-5A-02(e) (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1(c) (2013).
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in that “[t]he perpetrator who has been excluded from the dwelling unit un-
der court order remains liable under the lease . . . for rent or damages to the 
dwelling unit.”80 Arguably, statutes that do not expressly address the ongo-
ing liability of the perpetrator may obtain the same result by referring to 
general language in their early release provisions to the effect that no tenant 
other than the victim is released from the lease.81 However, providing spe-
cific language that a perpetrator may not be released from the lease miti-
gates or eliminates the loss a landlord is likely to experience by releasing a 
tenant-victim early from her lease. Another way to ensure that the “immi-
nent threat” standard is not too lenient is by requiring significant verification 
requirements.
C. Statutory Verification Requirements
Regardless of the trigger for relief for a tenant-victim, all states require 
some form of verification for their relief provisions to apply.82 Even these 
verification requirements differ among states.83
In Massachusetts, a tenant claiming to be a victim for purposes of early 
lease termination must show one of three types of proof.84 First, the tenant 
can provide verification in the form of a valid protection order.85 Second, a 
tenant can produce a record from a court or law enforcement agency of an 
act of domestic violence.86 Third, in the absence of such documentation, the 
tenant-victim may provide “written verification from any other qualified 
third party to whom the tenant . . . reported the domestic violence.”87 Nota-
bly, in Oregon, the statute provides a comprehensive sample verification 
form to be completed by the tenant and a “qualified third party” to be sub-
mitted to the landlord.88 In New Jersey, the verification requirements can be 
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1(c).
81. Some statutes expressly provide that relief of early termination is only for the vic-
tim-tenant and co-tenants are not released from the lease. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-
16-17.1(8) (2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.456 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, § 24(d)
(2013).
82. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1946.7 (West 2010 & Supp. 2013); D.C. CODE § 42-
3505.07(b)–(c) (2001); MINN. STAT. § 504B.206(1)(b) (2002 & Supp. 2013); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 57-22-5.1(2) (West 2010).
83. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 32-31-9-12 (2002 & Supp. 2012) (mentioning that verification 
may include a copy of a court-ordered civil order for protection or a criminal no-contact 
order, plus a copy of a safety plan); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.601b(3)(e) (2005 & Supp. 
2013) (giving a detailed example of a form of written verification that is to be certified by a 
“qualified third party”).
84. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, § 24(e)(1)–(3) (Supp. 2013).
85. Id. § 24(e)(1).
86. Id. § 24(e)(2).
87. Id. § 24(e)(3).
88. OR. REV. STAT. § 90.453(3) (2010 & Supp. 2013).
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met by providing documentation from a health care provider or licensed 
social worker.89 Police or court orders may be provided, but are not manda-
tory.90 In fact, the requisite verification may take the form of any one of six 
enumerated types of documentation.91 Unlike the Oregon statute, however, 
the New Jersey statute does not provide a standard verification form.92 Draft 
Three of the proposed RURLTA contains a detailed verification provision 
and includes a verification form.93 This section also includes an “example of 
verification” of instances of domestic violence that would qualify for early 
lease termination.94
Moreover, Draft Three of RURLTA includes a provision that imposes 
significant penalties on a tenant who falsely claims protection as a victim.95
Draft Three provides that “[i]f a tenant willfully submits a false verification 
to the landlord under subsection 508(2)(c), the court may award the landlord 
an amount up to [three] months’ periodic rent or [triple] actual damages, 
whichever is greater, and costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees.”96
D. Notice and Obligations for Vacating Tenant-Victims
Early termination provisions are designed to ensure that once a tenant-
victim “terminates his or her lease, the tenant is no longer responsible for 
the remaining rent due under the lease or any penalties for terminating the 
89. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-9.6(b) (West Supp. 2013).
90. Id.
91. Id.
The tenant . . . [must] provide[] the landlord with . . . (1) a certified copy of a 
permanent restraining order issued by a court . . . ; (2) a certified copy of a per-
manent restraining order from another jurisdiction . . . ; (3) a law enforcement 
agency record documenting the domestic violence, or certifying that the tenant or 
a child of the tenant is a victim of domestic violence; (4) medical documentation 
of the domestic violence provided by a health care provider; (5) certification, 
provided by Domestic Violence Specialist, or the director of a designated domes-
tic violence agency, that the tenant or a child of the tenant is a victim of domestic
violence; or (6) other documentation or certification, provided by a licensed so-
cial worker, that the tenant or a child of the tenant is a victim of domestic vio-
lence.
Id. § 46:8–9.6.
92. See id. (outlining a list of potential documentation that a tenant-victim may provide 
to the landlord, rather than providing a sample form for any of the enumerated third parties to 
complete).
93. RURLTA DRAFT 3, supra note 50 § 509(a).
94. Id. § 509.  The verification form includes a section for the tenant to complete, certi-
fying that he or she has been a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking that 
has “created a reasonable fear that [he or she] . . . will suffer serious bodily harm by contin-
ued residence in the dwelling unit.”  Id.
95. Id. at § 509(b).
96. Id.
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lease early.”97 State statutes, however, have varying notice and rent payment 
obligation provisions before the lease is deemed terminated. For example, 
the Massachusetts statute indicates that the victim has three months from the 
most recent act of domestic violence to notify the owner of the intent to ter-
minate the lease pursuant to the provision, and then the victim must vacate 
within those three months.98 Prior to termination, the tenant is liable for thir-
ty days’ rent or one full rental period following notice—whichever occurs 
later.99 The Massachusetts statute also provides that the vacating tenant-
victim may not be penalized by the owner withholding the security deposit, 
unless the owner has just cause for doing so.100
In Oregon while a tenant-victim must notify the landlord within ninety 
days of the last incident to retain status as “actual victim”, the tenant only 
needs to provide fourteen days’ written notice of the intent to terminate be-
fore the lease is actually terminated.101 The Oregon statute indicates that a 
landlord may apply the vacating tenant-victim’s security deposit to the pay-
ment of rent past due, or may refund it to the vacating tenant.102
Draft Three of the proposed RURLTA, similar to Oregon’s model, 
provides that the tenant must notify the landlord “not later than [90] days of 
the act of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking and at least [14] days 
before the release date specified in the notice. . . .”103
States have actively been making progress toward protecting victims of 
domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking in the area of early lease ter-
mination. RURLTA’s adoption of such provisions may encourage remaining 
states to provide similar protections for such victims. Another area in which 
RURLTA can take a leading role is in providing protection for servicemem-
bers.
97. Memorandum from Kurtz, supra note 5, at 15.
98. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, § 24(a)–(b) (2013).
99. Id. § 24(c).
100. Id.
101. OR. REV. STAT. § 90.453(2)(a) (2010 & Supp. 2013).
102. Id. § 90.456. See also IND. CODE § 32-31-9-12 (Supp. 2013) (providing a vacating 
victim of domestic violence is responsible for thirty days’ rent before the lease will be 
deemed terminated); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 750/15 (2009) (only three days); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 554.601b (Supp. 2013) (providing it is the “first day of the second month that rent is 
due after notice is given” for which the vacating tenant is liable). Curiously, the Michigan 
termination provision allows the landlord to retain prepaid rental amounts including prepay-
ment of the last months’ rent. Id.
103. RURLTA DRAFT 3, supra note 50 § 508(a).
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IV. THE SCRA’S BENEFITS FOR SERVICEMEMBERS
A. History and Purposes of the SCRA
Congress’ efforts to protect the nation’s servicemembers while on ac-
tive duty have dated as far back as the Civil War, when it placed a complete 
moratorium on all civil actions brought against servicemembers while on 
duty.104 During World War I, Congress passed the Soldiers’ and Sailor’s 
Civil Relief Act (SSCRA), which did away with the moratorium, but pro-
tected servicemembers instead by granting trial courts the discretion to pro-
vide equitable resolutions when a servicemember’s rights were affected by a 
civil action.105 Congress essentially reenacted the World War I legislation 
during World War II, by continuing to provide relief to servicemembers in 
civil actions.106 Since then, the protections for servicemembers have been 
renewed, amended, and frequently expanded.107 Congress replaced the 
SSCRA with the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) in 2003 and it 
continues to be the law today, although it has been amended several times 
since 2003.108
The SCRA has two stated purposes: (1) to strengthen national defense 
by providing for servicemembers, essentially enabling them to devote their 
time, energy, and focus on the needs of the Nation; and (2) to provide ser-
vicemembers with temporary relief in civil actions by suspending judicial 
and administrative proceedings while on active duty.109
Generally, the SCRA defines a “servicemember” to include members 
of “the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and the com-
missioned corps of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
and the Public Health Service.”110 While the definition seems relatively 
straightforward, applicability of the SCRA to Guardsmen depends on the 
104. R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34575, THE SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL 
RELIEF ACT (SCRA): AN EXPLANATION 1 (2012) available at http://paulryan.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/rl34575.pdf. “During the Civil War, Congress enacted an absolute moratorium 
on civil actions brought against soldiers and sailors.” Id.
105. Id. In 1918, Congress enacted the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act (SSCRA). 
Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. MASON, supra note 104, at 1.The Act continues to be amended regularly by Con-
gress. Id.
109. 50 U.S.C. App. § 502 (2006). It is important to note that the SCRA does not forgive 
all contractual obligations or debts of a servicemember. MASON, supra note 104, at 2. Nor 
does it provide a servicemember with absolute immunity from civil lawsuits. Id. Instead, it 
protects servicemembers by suspending civil actions while a servicemember is on active 
duty. Id. This prevents default judgments from being entered against a servicemember, 
among other things, while he or she is serving the country. Id.
110. MASON, supra note 104, at 2.
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status of the Guardsmen. 111 Army and Air Force National Guardsmen can 
serve in one of three statuses.112 For example, “the Act does not apply to 
Guardsmen during state activations, weekend drills, and most Title 32 activ-
ities. It does [however], apply to Guardsmen who have been called to feder-
al active duty.”113
In a recent case, Freeman v. United States, a servicemember was de-
nied the protection of the SCRA because he was not serving under a protect-
ed federal status.114 In Freeman, a state servicemember brought a claim 
against the United States for wrongful termination.115 The government 
moved to dismiss his claim, stating that the statute of limitations had run.116
In response, the state servicemember claimed that under the SCRA, the stat-
ute of limitations had tolled, precluding dismissal.117 The court concluded 
that because the state servicemember was serving in his state capacity as 
opposed to serving on active duty in his federal capacity, he was precluded 
from claiming any rights under the SCRA.118
B. SCRA Protections for Servicemembers
Various procedural protections are in place to safeguard servicemem-
bers under the SCRA.119 Some of those protections include limitations on 
default judgments, requests for stays of civil and administrative proceedings, 
tolling of civil statutes of limitations,120 releases from contractual obligations 
in cell phone contracts,121 and early lease terminations from residential hous-
ing.122 Protections typically begin on the day the servicemember enters ac-
tive duty and end on the day the servicemember is either released from or 
111. Kenneth T. Lumb, What Every Attorney Should Know About The Servicemembers 
Civil Relief Act, 23 DCBA BRIEF 18, 18–19 (April 2011)
http://www.dcbabrief.org/flipbook/0411/BRIEF_Apr2011.pdf.
112. Id. at 19.
Guardsmen can serve in any one of three statuses:  (1) On state active duty under 
state command and control and with state funding; (2) On federal active duty, 
under federal command and control and with federal funding (Title 10 status); 
and (3) On active duty under state command and control, but with federal fund-
ing (Title 32 Status).
Id.
113. Id.
114. Freeman v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 360, 366 (Fed. Cl. 2011).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 370.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 372.
119. LUMB, supra note 111, at 19.
120. Id. at 18, 22–23.
121. 50 U.S.C. App. § 535a. (2010).
122. Id. § 535.
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dies while on active duty.123 Some sections of the SCRA, including the ter-
mination of cell phone contracts and early lease termination provisions, al-
low the protections to become effective earlier, such as on the date the ser-
vicemember receives his orders.124 The SCRA also protects persons who are 
secondarily liable to the servicemember’s obligations.125 Persons secondarily 
liable include, “a surety, guarantor, endorser, accommodation maker, co-
maker, or other person who is or may be primarily or secondarily subject to 
the obligation or liability.”126 This protection applies to civil actions that are 
stayed, postponed, or suspended.127
Each provision of the SCRA contains specific requirements.128 Before 
turning to the specific section of the SCRA that governs early lease termina-
tions, it helps to examine briefly some of the requirements of the other spe-
cific provisions for comparison. While some of the benefits offered to ser-
vicemembers are not directly applicable to early lease terminations, it is 
important to understand the overall benefits the SCRA offers to service-
members and their families, as well as how various limitations in the statute 
can actually impose hefty burdens on servicemembers and even more so, on
their families.
1. Protection for Servicemembers Against Default Judgments
Servicemembers have been protected from default judgments since the 
introduction of civil relief legislation.129 Under the SCRA, for a plaintiff to 
obtain a default judgment against a servicemember, who has failed to appear 
in a civil action or proceeding, the plaintiff must submit an affidavit with the 
court, stating whether the defendant is on active duty accompanied by sup-
porting facts.130 If the plaintiff is without knowledge as to whether the de-
fendant is on active duty, the plaintiff must state so.131 If it appears that the 
defendant is on active duty, the court must appoint an attorney to represent 
the servicemember before entering a judgment.132 The SCRA protects the 
servicemember by requiring appointed counsel when his whereabouts are 
unknown.133 Moreover, if the whereabouts remain unknown, the service-
member will not be held to any judgment as a result of the attorney’s ac-
123. LUMB, supra note 111, at 19.
124. Id.; 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 535(a)(1)(b), 535a.(c).
125. 50 U.S.C. App. § 513.
126. Id. § 513(a).
127. Id. § 513.
128. See, e.g., id. §§ 517, 521, 522, 535, 535a.
129. MASON, supra note 104, at 1–2.
130. 50 U.S.C. app. § 521(b)(1)(A).
131. Id. § 521(b)(1)(B).
132. Id. § 521(b)(2).
133. Id. § 521(b)(2)–(3).
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tions.134 Servicemembers are further protected from default judgments be-
cause the SCRA makes it a criminal misdemeanor for a plaintiff to know-
ingly submit a false affidavit regarding the servicemember’s status, subject-
ing the plaintiff to a fine or imprisonment.135
In addition, the SCRA provides that default judgments that have been 
entered against a servicemember while on active duty, may be vacated or set 
aside.136 Upon application by or through the servicemember, the court is 
required to reopen the default judgment when the servicemember with a 
meritorious defense to the claim can demonstrate that because of his service, 
he was materially affected in bringing the defense at the time of the judg-
ment.137
2. Stay on the Proceedings
A servicemember who has received notice of a civil action or proceed-
ing to which he is a party, and is on active duty or within ninety days of his 
termination or release from active duty, can apply to the court for a stay of 
proceedings.138 Upon application, the court shall stay the proceedings for a 
mandatory ninety days.139 Additionally, the court may stay the action on its 
own motion.140 In both cases, however, the court must receive a letter that 
states the servicemember’s active duty materially affects his ability to ap-
pear in court because he is not authorized at that time to leave the military.141
The letter must also state when the servicemember is able to appear.142 If a 
servicemember’s military service continues to materially affect his ability to 
appear in court, he may apply for additional time to stay the action or pro-
ceeding.143
134. Id.
135. Id.§ 521(c).
136. 50 U.S.C. app. § 521(g).
137. Id. § 521(g)(1)(A)–(B). A servicemember has ninety days from his termination or 
release from active duty to file an application for vacation with the court.  Id. § 521(g)(2).
138. 50 U.S.C. App. § 522(a)(1)–(2) (2006).
139. Id. § 522(b)(1).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 522(b)(1)–(2).
142. Id. § 522(b)(2)(A).
143. Id.§ 522(d)(1). Additional time is rarely granted, especially in child custody pro-
ceedings.  See, e.g., George P. v. Super. Ct., 127 Cal. App. 4th 216, 219 (Cal.2005). By refus-
ing to grant additional time to stay the proceedings or action, the court is required to appoint 
counsel to represent the servicemember. Id. § 522(d)(2). The statute however, is silent as to 
whether the servicemember is bound by the attorney’s actions or whether any defense is 
deemed waived. See id. § 522.
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3. Tolling the Statute of Limitations
In addition, the SCRA allows a servicemember to toll the statute of 
limitations on any action brought by or against the servicemember.144 While 
“[t]he tolling provision [applies to] the servicemember’s heirs, executors, 
administrators or assigns, . . . it does not include a spouse or dependent[].”145
As a result, the statute of limitations for a spouse or dependent of a service-
member begins immediately once the cause of action arises, whereas the 
servicemember’s statute of limitations tolls until the servicemember is ter-
minated or released from active duty.146 While this may be a great benefit 
for the servicemember, it may cause some problems for his or her spouse 
and/or dependents, especially when both or multiple parties are involved in 
the same cause of action.147 Although, the statute does not require the ser-
vicemember to show that his military service materially affected his ability 
to prosecute or defend a case,148 the servicemember is not protected from a 
claim of laches.149 “If the other party can show inexcusable delay and preju-
dice resulting from the delay, the claim can be dismissed.”150
4. Cell Phone Contracts
Congress added the termination of cell phone contracts as a new bene-
fit to servicemembers under the SCRA in 2010.151 Under the new provision, 
a servicemember may terminate a cell phone contract entered into before 
“receiv[ing] military orders to relocate for a period of not less than [ninety] 
days [only] to a location that does not support the contract.”152 Therefore, 
the termination of a cell phone contract is conditional on whether cell phone 
service is available in the servicemember’s new location.153 While termina-
tion of the contract is likely to be available to servicemembers deployed out 
of the country, relocating within the United States is less likely to allow for 
termination.154 As a result, the benefit is substantially limited.155
144. LUMB, supra note 111, at 23; see also 50 U.S.C. app. § 526.
145. LUMB, supra note 111, at 23.
146. See id.
147. See id. For example, “a solider injured in an automobile collision while on active 
duty will have two years after leaving active duty to file suit. If his wife is also injured in the 
collision, she must file suit for her own injuries within two years of the collision.” Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. Tolling of the statute of limitations during military service is not available under 
the internal revenue laws of the United States. 50 U.S.C. App. § 526(c) (2006).
150. LUMB, supra note 111, at 24.
151. 50 U.S.C. app. § 535(a) n.11.
152. Id. § 535a(a)(1), (emphasis added).
153. Id.
154. See id.
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When the cell phone termination provisions apply,156 servicemembers 
are required to deliver written or electronic notice, along with a copy of mil-
itary orders and the date on which service will end, to the service provid-
er.157 The service provider must comply with the SCRA provision, accept 
the termination, and may not impose an early termination charge.158 Addi-
tionally, if the servicemember reinstates his or her cell phone contract within 
ninety days from his military release, the service provider cannot impose a 
reinstatement fee, other than the usual installation or equipment charges.159
The SCRA also allows the servicemember to keep his cell phone number if 
his period of relocation is within a time period of three years or less and he 
re-subscribes to the service within ninety days after his or her release from 
active duty.160 Because the provision lays out concrete requirements, it does 
not allow the service provider to obtain relief from the court.161 However, 
similar to other SCRA provisions, the right to terminate a cell phone con-
tract can be waived by the servicemember or by a person secondarily liable 
if the waiver meets the requirements specified in the SCRA.162
While the addition of the cell phone contract termination provision is a 
benefit to servicemembers, it does provide some limitations and complica-
tions.163 As stated previously, because it is only applicable to contracts that 
will no longer receive service after the servicemember relocates, it can be 
argued that more than likely the termination rights only apply to service-
members who are deployed overseas or are relocated to very rural areas of 
the United States.164 The termination provision is also limited when dealing
with cell phone family plan contracts.165 If the servicemember is a designat-
ed beneficiary of the family plan contract, the servicemember may be re-
moved from the contract if he meets the requirements to terminate.166 The 
155. See id.
156. Id. § 535a(a)(1), (b).  A servicemember must receive military orders to relocate for 
more than ninety days and his cell phone provider cannot support service in the area the 
servicemember is relocating to. Id.
157. 50 U.S.C. app. § 535a(a)(3).
158. Id. § 535a(e). However, the servicemember can still be held liable for any tax or 
obligation that is due at the time the contract terminates. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. § 535a(c).
161. See id. But see id. § 535(g). See also COLONEL JOHN S. ODOM, JR., supra note 4, at
58.
162. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 513, 517 (2006); see discussion supra Part III.B.1.; see also Ser-
vicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) Questions and Answers for Servicemembers,
JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/scra_qa_5-26-11.pdf (last
visited May 21, 2013).
163. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 535a.
164. See id. § 535a(a)(1).
165. Id. § 535a(d).
166. Id. § 535a(d)(1); see also id. § 535a.(a)(1), (b).
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designated beneficiaries, however, will remain liable under the contract, 
unless they relocate with the servicemember.167 This limiting provision may 
provide some hardship for a servicemember’s family, especially for a ser-
vicemember who is a Reservist or a Guardsman. Because Reservists or 
Guardsmen typically occupy different jobs before being called into active 
duty, the servicemember may earn less while in the military and may not be 
able to support a family plan in his new role.168 Additionally, without the 
servicemember’s financial support, the family may be in a difficult posi-
tion—unable to pay the monthly contract fee, but also unable to cancel due 
to sizeable termination fees.
5. Early Lease Termination—SCRA § 535
Section 535 is the primary provision of the SCRA that allows for ser-
vicemembers to terminate a variety of leases early.169 Leases covered by the 
provision are referred to in the SCRA as residential leases but are defined 
broadly to include residential, professional, business, agricultural, and any 
other lease with a similar purpose, such as motor vehicle leases.170 The 
SCRA allows the tenant to terminate a lease of premises when the lease was 
entered into before the servicemember entered into military service for the 
first time or the lease was executed while the servicemember was already in 
military service if during the duration of the lease the servicemember is or-
dered to deploy or has received a permanent change in station for a period of 
time of not less than ninety days.171 In the case of joint leases, a service-
member’s termination effectively terminates any obligation owed by a de-
pendent under that lease.172
The lease terminates when the servicemember provides written notice 
and a copy of military orders to the landlord.173 The effective date is “on the 
last day of the month following the month in which the notice is deliv-
ered.”174 Any unpaid rent prior to termination shall be paid by the service-
member on a prorated basis.175 The landlord, however, cannot charge the 
servicemember an early lease termination penalty but may enforce any obli-
167. Id. § 535a(d)(2).
168. See COLONEL JOHN S. ODOM, JR., supra note 4, at 4.
169. 50 U.S.C. app. § 535.
170. Id. § 535(a)(1).
171. Id. § 535(a)(1)(A)–(B).
172. Id. § 535(a)(2). Under the SCRA, a dependent is a servicemember’s spouse, child, or 
“an individual for whom the servicemember provided more than one-half of the individual’s 
support for 180 days immediately preceding an application for relief under [the] Act.” Id. §
511(4).
173. Id. § 535(c)(1)(A).
174. Id. § 535(d)(1).
175. 50 U.S.C. app. § 535(e)(1).
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gations or liabilities owed by the lessee.176 Criminal charges may be as-
sessed against a landlord who knowingly attempts to “seize[], hold[], or 
detain[] the personal effects, security deposit, or other property of a ser-
vicemember or a servicemember’s dependent who lawfully terminates a 
lease covered by this section.”177 However, a landlord may seek equitable 
relief upon application to the court prior to the termination effective date of 
the lease.178 If granted, the court may modify the relief to landlord “as justice 
and equity require.”179
The early lease termination provisions allowed by the SCRA have not 
been without controversy.180 Section 535 has been one of the most amended 
sections of the SCRA.181 The frequent amendments have been “a result of 
the continuing efforts of landlords and leasing companies to try and defeat 
the purpose of the section . . . to allow servicemembers to terminate premis-
es and vehicle leases when they are not in a position to utilize the premises 
or vehicles because of their military service.”182
Unfortunately, while the SCRA provisions appear straightforward and 
broadly written to ensure that servicemembers who find themselves having 
to terminate their leases are protected, there continue to be servicemembers 
whose rights are violated. In the past year, the Justice Department issued a 
press release announcing a settlement reached between a landlord and tenant 
under the SCRA.183 According to the release, “Empirian Property Manage-
ment Inc. (EPM) refused to terminate residential leases entered into by ac-
tive duty members of the U.S. Air Force,” who were later reassigned to a 
permanent change of station more than ninety miles away.184 The corre-
sponding complaint and consent order explained that EPM violated the 
176. Id. The United States commenced an action against landlord Occuquan Forest Drive, 
LLC and its agent, John Williams, on May 21, 2012, when the landlord and its agent refused 
to return a security deposit following proper termination by a servicemember under the 
SCRA. United States v. Williams, No. 1:12-cv-551, 2013 WL 596473, at *2 (E.D. Va. Feb. 
14, 2013).
177. 50 U.S.C. app. § 535(h).
178. Id. § 535(g).
179. Id.
180. See id. § 535 n.10. Even though the early lease termination provisions of the SCRA 
are broad and seemingly clear, landlords and leasing companies continue to violate the sec-
tion by refusing to allow a servicemember to properly terminate his lease. Id. See also Wil-
liams, 2013 WL 596473, at *4, for a recent example of a landlord attempting to defeat the 
purpose of the section by holding a servicemember, who properly terminated his residential 
lease, liable for continued rent payments and withheld his security deposit. Id.
181. 50 U.S.C. App. § 535 n.10
182. Id.
183. Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Settles Landlord-Tenant 
Case Under Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2012/March/12-crt-268.html.
184. Id.
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SCRA when it refused to allow early lease terminations to the servicemem-
bers who were attempting to comply with their service orders.185 The U.S. 
Attorney for the District of Nebraska, Deborah R. Gilg, explained that 
“‘[t]his settlement sends a strong message that the rights of our service per-
sonnel will be protected.’”186
C. State Solutions to SCRA Problems
1. Waiver
Although courts liberally interpret the SCRA protections for “those 
who have been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up the burdens of 
the nation,”187 the waiver provisions within the SCRA can take any and all 
of those rights away from servicemembers and persons secondarily liable.188
A servicemember can waive his rights under the SCRA, by written agree-
ment regarding “the modification, termination, or cancellation of a contract,
lease, or bailment; or an obligation secured by a mortgage, trust, deed, lien, 
or other security in the nature of a mortgage.”189 Additionally, a service-
member can waive his rights to “[t]he repossession, retention, foreclosure, 
185. Id.
186. Id. The Justice Department brought an action against a landlord under the SCRA for 
the first time in 2009.  Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Announces 
Settlement of Its First Landlord-Tenant Case Under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act 
(Sept. 24, 2009) http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/September/09-crt-1022.html.
The Justice Department today announced that it had reached a settlement 
with a Virginia landlord to resolve allegations that she violated the Ser-
vicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA). The lawsuit alleged that the land-
lord failed to return prepaid rent and security deposits to a tenant who had 
terminated her lease early in order to comply with military orders to relo-
cate from to Georgia. . . . The complaint, which was filed with the settle-
ment, represents the first lawsuit involving a landlord-tenant matter 
brought by the Justice Department under the SCRA.
Id. Other actions on behalf of servicemembers, like this one, by the Justice Department can 
be found at the DOJ website. Civil Rights Cases and Investigations Involving Servicemem-
bers and Veterans, JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/crt/spec_topics/military/cases.php.
See also United States v. Williams, No. 1:12–cv–551, 2013 WL 596473, at *1 (E.D. Va. Feb. 
14, 2013). The United States commenced an action on behalf of a servicemember who right-
fully terminated his lease under the SCRA and his landlord continued to hold him accounta-
ble for subsequent rent payments and refused to return his security deposit. Id. at *2. The 
tenant had provided proper notice under the SCRA and had terminated his lease in compli-
ance with the Act’s requirements. Id. at *4. Therefore, the servicemember did not owe any 
subsequent rent. Id. Additionally, the court found that “[d]efendants’ claims for property 
damage were not proper under the terms of the lease and [they] had no basis to withhold [the 
servicemember’s] security deposit.” Id.
187. Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943).
188. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 513, 517 (2006).
189. Id. § 517(b)(1)(A)–(B).
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sale, forfeiture, or taking possession of property that is security for any obli-
gation; or was purchased or received under a contract, lease, or bailment.”190
For a waiver to be effective, it must be in writing—at least twelve point 
font191—and executed in a separate document from the obligation to which 
the waiver applies.192 Additionally, the waiver agreement must be executed 
either during or after the servicemember’s military service.193 A waiver exe-
cuted prior to a servicemember’s start of military service is therefore, inef-
fective.194 This provides some protection for the servicemember, if he is 
given information about and understands how a waiver might affect him 
while he is in service. Whether servicemembers truly know their rights and 
knowingly waive them is the real question. If housing is scarce in the areas 
where the servicemember lives, will he routinely sign a waiver or other doc-
ument the landlord requires?
Some states have addressed the issues associated with waiver by elimi-
nating the option all together in early lease terminations.195 For example, the 
states of Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana have all inserted non-waiver lan-
guage into their state servicemember early lease termination statutes. Those 
statutes provide language to the effect that “[t]he provisions of this section 
may not be waived or modified by the agreement of the parties under any 
circumstances.”196 By eliminating the option of waiver all together, these 
states ensure that the critical public policy goals underlying the statutory 
protection for servicemembers are not undermined by private residential 
rental agreements that may have been entered into by parties without com-
plete understanding of their rights or with unequal bargaining power.   
2. Materially Affected Language
As described above, several sections of the SCRA require the service-
member and/or a dependent to make a showing of material effect in order to 
190. Id. § 517(b)(2)(A)–(B).
191. Id. § 517(c).
192. Id. § 517(a).
193. Id. § 517(a). A final requirement for the waiver to be effective is to name the ser-
vicemember concerned, if he is not a named party in the original instrument. Id.This require-
ment alludes to the fact that a person secondarily liable to a servicemember’s obligation can 
also waive his rights under the SCRA. Id. § 513(d)(1). For a waiver to be effective it must 
comply with the same requirements that the servicemember’s waiver is subject to and it must
be entered into after the servicemember enters active duty. Id. § 513(d)(2).
194. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 517.
195. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 83.682(5) (2004).
196. FLA. STAT. § 83.682(5) (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-22(f) (2010); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:3261(D.) (2009).
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receive relief from the Act.197 For example, when a servicemember attempts 
to vacate a default judgment or stay a proceeding, he must make a showing 
that his current military orders materially affected his ability to defend the 
civil action—in cases of default judgment; or appear in court—in cases of 
stay of proceedings.198 Materially affected, however, is not defined in the 
SCRA.199 While the court may consider several factors in order to determine 
whether a servicemember or his dependent has been materially affected as a 
result of his military orders, two factors in particular tend to be the most 
commonly considered: “(1) the servicemember’s availability, and (2) the 
necessity of the servicemember’s presence.”200 When determining the ser-
vicemember’s availability, the court will look at the servicemember’s geo-
graphic distance from the forum state, ability to leave service, and some-
times, economic circumstances.201 A servicemember’s availability while 
stationed overseas, such as Afghanistan, would be materially affected by a 
pending civil action in the United States. In contrast, a servicemember sta-
tioned in Washington D.C. may not be materially affected by a pending ac-
tion in Virginia.202
With regard to the second factor, the Supreme Court of the United 
States stated in Boone v. Lightner,203 that a defendant’s “[a]bsence when 
one’s rights or liabilities are being adjudged is usually prima facie prejudi-
cial.”204 Despite the Supreme Court’s clear language, some courts have de-
cided the issue of a servicemember’s presence based on whether it is essen-
tial to the action at hand.205 This has led to a denial of relief for many ser-
vicemembers, especially in child custody proceedings.206
While the “materially affected” language is not applicable directly to 
residential early lease terminations under the SCRA, in order for the 
SCRA’s protections to extend to dependents, Section 538 requires a show-
197. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. app. § 522. But see id. § 535. Currently, “materially affected”
language is not applicable directly to residential early lease terminations under the SCRA. Id.
198. Id. §§ 521, 522.
199. See id. § 511; see also ODOM, supra note 4, at 4.
200. See Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 572 (1943); George P. v. Super. Ct., 127 Cal. 
App. 4th 216, 219 (Cal 2005).
201. See Boone, 319 U.S. at 572; ODOM, supra note 4, at 4.
202. Rosier v. McDaniel, 28 S.E.2d 908, 913−14 (W. Va. 1944).
203. 319 U.S. 561 (1943).
204. Id. at 575.
205. See, e.g., id.
206. See, e.g., George P. v. Super.r Ct., 127 Cal. App. 4th 216, 219 (Cal. 2005). While the 
court is generally required to grant an initial 90-day stay upon proper application with the 
court, any additional stays are deemed discretionary. Id. at 224. Despite his post-deployment 
to Iraq, the petitioner’s request for an additional stay in a child custody proceeding was de-
nied because the court determined that petitioner had appeared in a critical hearing prior to 
the request for additional stay, was represented by counsel from the beginning, and was not 
prevented from communicating with DSS while in Iraq. Id. at 226.
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ing of material effect.207 A dependent of a servicemember may be entitled to 
the protections of the SCRA, but must first apply to the court to obtain relief 
and then must make a showing that his or her “ability to comply with a 
lease, contract, bailment, or other obligation is materially affected” as a 
result of the servicemember’s military service.208 Admittedly, a spouse or 
dependent will be protected if the servicemember executes the lease or con-
tract in his own name.209 However, if the lease or contract is only in the de-
pendent’s name, the SCRA will not apply without the requisite materially 
affected showing.210
In order to protect the dependents, it is recommended that the service-
member be a part of the agreement.211 However, this is not always feasible, 
especially when a dependent must enter into a contract or a lease while the 
servicemember is away on active duty.212 For example, a spouse may change 
apartments while the servicemember is deployed.213 Sometimes in these 
circumstances, it is easier for the spouse to execute the lease in her own 
name rather than have her deployed husband co-sign. However, doing so 
will prohibit her ability to invoke the SCRA early lease termination protec-
tion directly.214 The spouse could attempt to use the SCRA’s provisions for 
dependents, but those can be extremely burdensome because they require 
the spouse to apply to a court for relief and to demonstrate that the spouse’s 
ability to comply with the lease is materially affected by the servicemem-
ber’s service.215
Interestingly, New York has eliminated the problem that arises when a 
servicemember’s spouse is the only party on the lease.216 The New York
state statute allows the spouse coverage under the servicemember’s early 
lease termination provision if the spouse solely executes the lease.217 This 
207. 50 U.S.C. app. § 538.
208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. See Kate, Spouses and Leases, PAYCHECK CHRONICLES BLOG (Mar. 6, 2010, 12:00 
AM ), http://paycheck-chronicles.military.com/2010/03/06/spouses-and-leases/.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 538.  Additionally, a dependent may want to be cautious when 
deciding how to approach naming a servicemember on a contract or lease as it could be 
deemed an inappropriate use of the SCRA. ODOM, supra note 4, at 75. Colonel John S. 
Odom, Jr., warns that a nonservicemember debtor may not transfer his or her interest or obli-
gation solely for the purpose of invoking the servicemember’s protections under the SCRA. 
Id. Therefore, a dependent must put the servicemember’s name on the instrument during the 
initial signing, rather than later amend a contract or lease in an effort to wrongfully invoke 
the SCRA’s protections.
216. See N.Y. MIL. LAW § 310.1. (McKinney 2013).
217. Id.
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means that a military spouse in New York will not be required to apply to 
the court and show how she has been materially affected as a result of her 
spouse’s military orders.218 Instead, the state statute allows her to automati-
cally receive the protections of the SCRA by executing the lease in her own 
name—extending her husband’s protections as a servicemember to her.219
This essentially protects the servicemember’s spouse while also embracing 
judicial economy—by freeing up the courts from unnecessary proceedings.
3. Landlord Relief When “Justice and Equity So Require” in Resi-
dential Leases
Section 535 of the SCRA contains an additional hurdle for service-
members to obtain relief.  It allows the landlord to apply to a court for equi-
table relief prior to the termination date of the lease.220 In contrast, other 
sections, such as the one allowing termination of cell phone contracts, make 
the service provider abide by the statutory requirements without any ability 
for the provider to seek judicial or equitable relief.221 For a landlord to block 
a servicemember’s early termination of a lease by petitioning for equitable 
relief, Section 535(g) does not require the landlord to demonstrate any par-
ticular equitable theory.222 The ability of the landlord to ask a court to bal-
ance the equities may completely gut the benefits of the early lease termina-
tion benefits. A goal of the SCRA is to have a servicemember focus on the 
mission and not be unnecessarily distracted by ongoing economic commit-
ments at home.223 If a servicemember needs to be concerned that the lease 
will continue simply because a landlord will take him or her to court, the 
servicemember cannot rely on the provision and plan accordingly.
218. Id.; see also 50 U.S.C. app. § 538.
219. N.Y. MIL.LAW § 310.1.
220. 50 U.S.C. app. § 535(g).  The SCRA also allows for landlord relief in the termina-
tion of motor vehicle leases.  Id.; see also id. § 535(b)(2).
221. See id. § 535a.
222. Climax, LLC. v. Snake River Oncology, 241 P.3d 964, 969 (Idaho 2010). Instead, 
the court is called to balance equities between the parties and then determine if a relief modi-
fication is warranted. Id. Ultimately, to use the protections under the SCRA, compliance with 
military orders must be the underlying reason for terminating a lease early. Id. However, if a 
servicemember uses the protection for an opportunistic gain, the court has broad discretion to 
craft a remedy “as justice and equity require” for the landlord. 50 U.S.C. App. § 535(g); 
Snake River Oncology, 241 P.3d at 969. The Idaho Supreme Court remanded a case to the 
district court to determine whether a landlord was entitled to relief—under broad discretion—
when a servicemember rented an office building for his medical practice and then used the 
SCRA to get out of his lease after purchasing space in a new office building. Id. at 971.
223. See supra Part IV.A.
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While some states have included court modification of equitable relief 
within their early lease termination statutes for servicemembers,224 others 
have excluded it completely.225 Similar to waiver, several states have done 
away with requiring the court to balance the equities between parties when 
dealing with a servicemember terminating his lease early.226 Eliminating 
equitable relief to the landlord all together ensures that the provision works 
in practice, not just in theory. Additionally, it is in the interest of judicial 
economy to do away with the procedure of involving the courts to determine 
whether an early lease termination by a servicemember was fair.227 States 
that wish to keep some equitable relief for the landlord should consider a 
balance between the two extremes—broad court discretion for modification 
versus no modification at all. Instead of eliminating equitable relief all to-
gether, states could allow a limited remedy when a landlord can show that 
the servicemember terminated his lease purely for opportunistic reasons.
4. Coverage for State Servicemembers
Currently, state servicemembers are not covered under the SCRA.228
Several problems can arise as a result of their lack of coverage. For exam-
ple, when dealing with court proceedings, a state servicemember may be just 
as unlikely as a federal servicemember, to have the ability to leave active 
duty to attend to civil proceedings—even if the courthouse is down the 
street.229 While a civilian may risk losing his or her job as a result of attend-
ing civil proceedings, a state servicemember faces an even greater risk—
failure to work constitutes a military offense that could lead to incarcera-
tion.230 A federal servicemember can request a stay of proceedings by com-
plying with the requirements of the SCRA.231 A state servicemember, on the 
other hand, does not have that option.232
Similarly, a state servicemember is not entitled to the SCRA protec-
tions under termination of cell phone contracts or early lease termination 
224. See, e.g., N.Y. MIL LAW.§ 310.2. (McKinney 2013); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
7315.1(f) (West 2013).
225. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 83.682(5) (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-22(f) (2013) (Lex-
isNexis); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3261(D.) (2013).
226. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 83.682(5) (2004).
227. Very few cases have been found showing the servicemember has been opportunistic 
in terminating his lease rather than doing so by necessity. See Snake River Oncology, 241 
P.3d at 969.
228. 50 U.S.C. App. § 511(1)–(2) (2006); see also ODOM, supra note 4, at 5.
229. ODOM, supra note 4, at 5.
230. Id.
231. 50 U.S.C. App. § 522(b).
232. See id. §§ 511, 522(b).
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provisions.233 Nor are they provided protection from default judgments, stay 
of proceedings, or an opportunity to toll a statute of limitations for a civil 
action brought by or against them.234
Some states have remedied this problem in the early lease termination 
protection by providing relief for state servicemembers within their own 
statutes.235 For example, Georgia defines and expands the term “service-
member” to include not only the SCRA’s definition, but also “the Georgia 
National Guard or the Georgia Air National Guard.”236 Likewise, Pennsyl-
vania has expanded the SCRA’s definition of a servicemember by including 
“a member of the Pennsylvania National Guard serving on full-time duty or 
as a civil service technician with a national guard unit.”237 Notably, these 
states provide for their servicemembers to benefit from the protections pro-
vided by Section 535 of the SCRA for early lease terminations.238
D. Proposed Version for RURLTA
As this article has revealed, there are several gaps currently within the 
SCRA that can drastically limit the protections servicemembers or their de-
pendents receive.239 These gaps offer states an opportunity to expand their 
own statutes to provide for state and federal servicemembers alike.
In drafting a section for servicemembers, the RURLTA Committee 
should consider the usage of waiver, the material effect language burden on 
dependents, balancing of equities, and expanding coverage. Regarding 
waivers, it is recommended that any RURLTA provisions for servicemem-
bers disallow waivers. While waiver may be acceptable for some of the oth-
er rights for servicemembers found in the SCRA, the early termination of 
residential leases provisions are critical. Eliminating the ability to waive the 
servicemembers’ rights and protections for residential leases under the 
SCRA is necessary to ensure the protections work as a practical matter. As 
discussed, waivers can eliminate the benefits when there is unequal bargain-
ing power.240 Second, the material effect language can be harsh on service-
members and dependents alike. By eliminating this high standard, service-
members and their dependents can benefit from the rights under the SCRA 
without undue burdens. Third, the RURLTA should eliminate the equitable 
relief provisions for landlords all together. Finally, RURLTA should include 
233. See id. §§ 511, 535, 535a.
234. See id. §§ 511, 521, 522, 526.
235. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-22(a) (2010).
236. 50 U.S.C. app. § 511; GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-22(a).
237. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7315.1(a) (West 2013).
238. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-22(a); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7315.1(a).
239. See discussion supra Part IV.C.4.
240. See discussion supra Part IV.C.1.
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state servicemembers, in addition to federal servicemembers, so that both 
are equally protected.
V. CONCLUSION
As this article discusses, the ability of tenant-victims’ of domestic vio-
lence, sexual violence, and stalking to terminate their leases early is a vital 
public policy concern. Similarly, the need for active duty servicemembers to 
readily comply with military orders is critical.  The article demonstrates that 
there is a need for additional and uniform laws ensuring tenant-victims can 
terminate their leases. In addition, even though the SCRA provides protec-
tion to federal servicemembers who must relocate, it is not as efficient and 
effective as public policy would dictate. Moreover, the state versions of pro-
tections for servicemembers are not consistent.  Both categories of tenants 
face exigent circumstances when terminating their leases and should be pro-
vided with effective and practical mechanisms for early lease terminations. 
Accordingly, the article strongly suggests that the proposed RURLTA con-
tain provisions for both.
